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Introduction 
Controversy over GMOs has originated from the EU, a part of the world already 
devastated from food-related scares such as mad cow disease.  European Union (EU) 
responded to negative consumer sentiment of GM foods by imposing a moratorium in 
1998 that precluded approval of new GM varieties.  However, evidence available thus far 
does not support alleged health or environmental hazards attributed to GMOs.  Further, 
US and other countries announced in May, 2003 that they would file a formal WTO 
dispute to abolish the moratorium which they believe distort agricultural and food trade.  
Finding it increasingly difficult to rationalize its position, European Parliament approved 
mandatory traceability and labeling legislation with a 0.9 % tolerance level in July 2003 
as a measure to replace the current moratorium.   
This measure apparently transfers the burden of acceptance/rejection of GM 
technology from regulatory authority to the market mechanism.  Yet, for consumers to 
ultimately exercise the sovereign power of determining acceptance/rejection of GM 
technology, food manufacturers and retailers in Europe need to put labeled GM products 
in the supermarket shelves (Carter and Gruere, 2003; Gaskel et al, 2003).  Thus far, they 
have avoided food products that contain any GM ingredients, in line with the prevailing 
popular sentiment there against agrobiotechnology.  That is, European food supply chains 
strategically decided to focus on non-GM foods instead of allowing consumers to choose 
between GM and non-GM foods.  Hence, there has been no need to segregate non-GM 
from GM foods.   
The critical question is whether European food industry takes the new measure as 
a favorable signal that GM food can be marketed in the EU and decide to offer GM food   2
to consumers.  Carter and Gruere (2003) suggest that lack of economic incentives for 
food industry to offer labeled GM food coupled with political pressure by anti-GM 
activists have prevented mandatory labeling from providing consumer choice between 
GM and non-GM food.  That is, under current negative sentiment against 
agrobiotechnology, the mandatory labeling regulation acts as a market barrier, rather than 
facilitating consumer choice.  They suggest that two factors underlie the food industry’s 
position whether or not to offer GM labeled food: (i) the share of consumers who are 
willing to buy GM labeled food, and (ii) the profitability per unit of final product sold.   
Previous research elicited willingness-to-pay (WTP) as a measure of behavioral 
intentions with respect to non-GM foods in Europe (Burton et al, 2001; Moon and 
Balasubramanian, 2003).  These studies presented some insight into European 
consumer’s preferences about GM and non-GM food that could be useful in estimating 
the size of market for non-GM food.  Nonetheless, eliciting willingness-to-pay for non-
GM food is not sufficient in determining whether and to what degree GM food is 
substitutable with non-GM version.  Knowledge about such substitutability is the key to 
determining the strength (or weakness) of demand for GM food.   
The minimum amount of discount that consumers would be willing to accept in 
return for purchasing GM food products (WTA) is the relevant concept that can shed 
light on the strength of demand for GM food and its substitutability with non-GM version.  
While the standard economic theory predicts that these two measures (WTP and WTA) 
would converge with small income effects (Willig, 1976; Randall and Stoll, 1980; 
Walters, 1979), WTA is expected to be significantly greater than WTP under two 
conditions: (i) when endowment effect exists or when the good in question does not have   3
close substitutes (Kaheman and Tversky, 1979; Haneman, 1990).  Therefore, there is a 
considerable need to investigate willingness-to-accept (WTA) in addition to willingness-
to-pay (WTP) in order to provide more detailed information on behavioral intentions with 
respect to GM and non-GM food and substitutability between them. 
Objectives 
Our research aims to elicit willingness-to-accept (WTA) of UK consumers along 
with willingness-to-pay (WTP) to shed light on the size of market for GM food and to 
determine substitutability between GM and non-GM foods.  Specifically, this study 
measures on the one hand the maximum premium that consumers would be willing to pay 
(WTP) for a box of breakfast cereals made of non-GM ingredients and maximum 
additional weekly food expenditures that consumers would be willing to pay to avoid 
foods that contain GM ingredients.  On the other hand, we measure minimum discount 
that consumers would be willing to accept (WTA) for a box of breakfast cereals made of 
GM ingredients and minimum percentage decrease in weekly food bill that consumers 
would be willing to accept (WTA) to consume GM food products.   
When properly designed, estimates of willingness-to-accept (WTA) can present 
the following information: (a) strength of demand for GM food (GM-technology 
embracing or who prefer GM and non-GM equally), (b) who are willing to consume GM 
food at some discount (price-conscious group), (c) who will never consume GM food, 
and (d) who are not sure.  Estimates of willingness-to-pay (WTP) can provide four types 
of information: (a) strength of demand for non-GM food, (b) protest respondents, (c) 
GM-technology embracing, and (d) who are not sure.  While both measures can 
commonly identify GM-embracing, protest and uncertain group of consumers, price-  4
conscious group who are willing to consume GM food at some discount can be identified 
only by willingness-to-accept (WTA) measure.  Information on such price-conscious 
group is critical to determining the degree of substitutability between GM and non-GM 
food.  
Divergence between WTA vs. WTP 
Our research proposes to elicit willingness-to-pay premium for non-GM food and 
willingness-to-accept discount to forgo such an opportunity.  Accordingly, the good to be 
valued in our research is the non-GM property of food products: i.e., consumers are 
required to pay a premium to obtain it and offered a discount to give it up (to consume 
GM food products).   Willingness-to-pay measures the value that consumers place when 
they purchase goods, whereas willingness-to-accept measures the price that consumers 
ask when they sell goods.  In our study, consumers hypothetically buy non-GM property 
of food products (revealing willingness-to-pay), while selling it and hypothetically 
consuming GM food as a result (revealing willingness-to-accept).   
The theoretical convergence between WTP and WTA indicates that the intensity 
of demand for non-GM food as represented by mean WTP (the larger the stronger) 
should not differ from the intensity of demand for GM food as represented by mean 
WTA (the smaller the stronger).  For example, if consumers would be willing to pay on 
average $0.50 more to avoid purchasing breakfast cereals made of GM ingredients, they 
would be expected to be willing to accept on average $0.50 as a discount in return for 
giving up the opportunity to purchase non-GM breakfast cereals. 
A number of field contingent valuation research and lab experiments, however, 
have consistently shown that there is a significant discrepancy between willingness-to-  5
pay (WTP) and willingness-to-accept (WTA) measures of value for public goods (e.g., 
Knetsch and Sinden, 1984; Brookshire and Coursey, 1987; Kahneman, Knetsch and 
Thaler, 1990).  Two explanations have been advanced to rationalize the divergence 
between theory and empirical findings.   
First, Kaheman and Tversky (1979) and Thaler (1980) suggested that WTA 
values be higher than WTP due to endowment effect.  The endowment effect proposes 
that people value goods more highly once they own them, a plausible result of loss 
aversion indicated by prospect theory (i.e., losses are weighted substantially more than 
objectively commensurate gains in the evaluation of prospects and trades).  In fact, 
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990) demonstrate in their lab experiments using coffee 
mugs that such endowment effect persists even after controlling for transaction costs and 
the opportunities to learn.   
Second, Haneman (1990) illustrates that, for consumer theory involving quantity 
changes, WTP and WTA do not need to converge and the difference between the two 
measures depends not only on an income effect but also on a substitution effect.  Further, 
he shows that substitution effects could exert a far greater effect on the relation between 
WTP and WTA than do income effects.  That is, he indicates that the convergence of 
WTP and WTA is expected only when the good in question has a very close substitute.  
When the good has an imperfect substitute, a value divergence will arise.  In support of 
Haneman’s argument, Shorgren et al. (1994) present evidence of the significant role of 
substitutability in the divergence between WTP and WTA using experiments involving 
private and public goods.  They found that the divergence of WTP and WTA value   6
measures disappears for private goods with a close substitute whereas, for a private non-
market good with no close substitute, the divergence was robust and consistent. 
Given the generally negative sentiment against GM food in Europe, we expect 
that UK consumers are likely to have emotional attachment to traditional non-GM food 
and consequently bidding between GM and non-GM foods would be associated with 
endowment effects.  Further, non-GM foods are hypothesized to be less than perfectly 
substitutable with GM food to some consumers and consequently GM-free property can 
not be perfectly exchanged for money.  This hypothesized imperfect substitutability 
suggests that a frictionless intermediate monetary exchange is not feasible between GM 
and non-GM food.  These two hypotheses would cause WTA to be greater than WTP.  
Hence, in addition to analyzing protest, uncertain and GM technology-embracing 
respondents from WTP and WTA responses, our research test the equivalence between 
mean WTP (intensity of demand for non-GM food) and mean WTA (intensity of demand 
for GM foods).   
Contingent Valuation Survey Design 
Survey instrument was designed to measure two sets of variables of interest in 
this study: (1) attitudes and perceptions as related to agrobiotechnology, and (2) 
behavioral intentions with a focus on WTP and WTA.  The survey was administered via 
online in the UK using web-based household panel maintained by Harris Interactive 
(consulting firm specializing in web-based public poll and opinion survey).  
Questionnaires were sent to about 2,500 participants of the online panel via electronic 
mails and 1,090 consumers completed the online survey within the next seven days. 
The first part seeks to measure a range of psychological variables including   7
consumer attitudes toward application of genetic engineering to crop and food production 
and medicine, self-rated knowledge of agrobiotechnology, perceptions about negative 
and positive attributes of agrobiotechnology and opinions about the recent legislation of 
mandatory labeling and traceability.   
We selected two product category to elicit WTP and WTA for: (i) a box of 
breakfast cereals made of non-GM and GM ingredients (base price of £ 2.80), and (ii) 
weekly expenditure on food whose ingredients are non-GM and GM (actual expenditure 
in £).  A box of breakfast cereals represents an individual food item whose share within 
food budget is likely to be very small, whereas the second good represents the entire food 
category and will be a significant share of family budget.  We test whether WTP and 
WTA differ across the two product categories.  This testing is significant in identifying 
any potential discrepancy in consumer valuation due to scale effect. 
  Respondents were asked to consider the following situation:  
[Consumers might have to pay a higher price for nonGM foods due to the costs of 
segregation in the production and marketing system plus the additional costs of testing, 
certification and labeling GM foods.  Suppose that you walk into a grocery store and 
want to buy food products.  The grocery store carries food products of two types: (1) 
made from GM crops, and (2) made from conventional non-GM crops 
 
Table 1 presents four different contingent valuation questions asked to respondents in 
relation to the above hypothetical situation in the grocery store: (i) willingness-to-pay for 
breakfast cereals made of non-GM ingredients, (ii) willingness-to-accept for breakfast 
cereals made of GM ingredients, (iii) willingness-to-pay extra in the form of weekly 
expenditure for food made of non-GM ingredients, and (iv) willingness-to-accept  
decrease in the form of weekly expenditure for food made of GM ingredients. 
These CV questions were asked using payment card method.  Payment card   8
questioning technique has gained popularity in recent years to compromise the 
advantages and disadvantages associated with the open-ended and closed ended formats.  
CV questions in the form of payment card contains an ordered set of threshold values 
(Cameron and Huppert, 1989).  The payment card for a box of breakfast cereals includes 
a range of premium from £0.00 to £2.10 for a box of breakfast cereals (with a base price 
of £2.80) made of non-GM crops and identical range of discount for WTA question.  The 
payment card for weekly expenditure ranges from 0 % to 75 %.  The card also includes 
“Don’t know” category for respondents who are unsure about this issue.  For willingness-
to-accept (WTA) measures, a category is added to the list to capture respondents who 
will never buy GM food at any discount.  In payment card approach, consumers are asked 
simply to go over the range of values and to circle the highest amount they would be 
willing to pay.   
Contingent valuation method may present a problem stemming from hypothetical 
nature of questions posed to respondents.  Hypothetical bias refers to the tendency that 
respondents overstate the amount that they are willing to pay for public or private goods 
of research interest.  A number of studies present evidence that hypothetical transactions 
are not incentive compatible (e.g., Cummings et al 1995; Loomis et al, 1996).  To test the 
potential hypothetical bias, our survey design incorporates cheap talk script method.  The 
cheap talk script method explains the nature of hypothetical bias prior to administration 
of CV questions.  Cummings and Taylor tested the effect of cheap talk method using 
laboratory experiments for several public goods and found that the method eliminated 
hypothetical bias.  Using mail survey, Lusk (2002) presented additional evidence that the   9
cheap talk script was effective in removing hypothetical bias in measuring willingness-to-
pay for Golden rice for subjects unfamiliar with this food.   
Our study tests the effect of cheap talk script in the context of web-based online 
survey.  Note that the evidence presented above came from studies using experimental 
auction and mail survey methods.  Moreover, our study investigates the role of cheap talk 
script in eliciting willingness-to-accept as well as willingness-to-pay.  While the cheap 
talk script is designed to correct overstatement problem primarily in the context of 
willingness-to-pay, the overstatement problem may arise as well in eliciting willingness-
to-accept because of the hypothetical nature of the questions.  The cheap talk script may 
motivate respondents not to overstate the amount of discount they require in exchange for 
giving up non-GM food.   
Both WTP and WTA questions are posed to the same sample of respondents.  
Hence, it is legitimate to suspect of potential question ordering effect on elicited values of 
WTP and WTA.  We test whether question ordering has any bearing on elicited values of 
WTP and WTA.  Half of the sample received survey questionnaire that presented WTP  
prior to WTA questions in half of the sample, while WTA questions are posed first in 
other half of the sample. 
In summary, we conduct four experiments in our CV survey: (i) testing 
differences in CV responses across two product categories; (ii) comparing across WTP 
and WTA, (iii) testing the effect of the cheap talk script on WTP and WTA, and (iv) 
assessing question ordering effect on elicited WTP and WTA values. 
Analysis of WTA and WTP Responses 
Segmentation of Consumers   10
This section provides an analysis of respondents’ responses to WTA and WTP 
questions.  Table 2 presents the distribution of responses to the four contingent valuation 
questions across the 16 categories of response.  About 21 percent (21.2 % for breakfast 
cereals; 20.5 % for weekly expenditure) of UK respondents selected the category of zero 
premium, indicating that they would not be willing to pay any premium to purchase non-
GM food.  Of the 21 percent, about 8 percent were protest responses, rejecting the notion 
of paying premium to purchase non-GM food.  The remaining 13 percent preferred GM 
and non-GM food equally.  About 21 percent of respondents indicated that they were not 
sure about whether to pay premium to avoid GM food.  In sum, nearly 58 percent were 
willing to pay varying sizes of premiums to avoid GM food.   
With regard to WTA responses, about 45 percent of respondents voiced their 
rejection of GM food by selecting the category “I’ll never buy GM food at any discount.”  
After accounting for about 8 percent of unsure respondents, nearly 47 percent of 
respondents were willing to consume GM food at some discount, including 12 percent 
who did not need any discount to buy GM food.   
There is a significant discrepancy in the percentages of consumers who were 
unsure across WTP and WTA.  We conjecture that asking willingness-to-pay premium is 
more offensive to consumers than asking willingness-to-accept discount.  Although the 
survey presents a follow-up question that enables respondents (who chose zero premium) 
to express their protest against the notion of paying premium for conventional non-GM 
food, they may have not expected this option, causing a significant percent of 
respondents to choose the category of “Don’t know.”   11
Table 3 provides summary information on WTP and WTA responses.  Four 
distinct groups can be identified from the table: (i) who are unsure, (ii) who fully accept 
GM food, (iii) who never accept GM food (some of them would be willing to pay 
premium to purchase non-GM food and others would protest the notion of paying 
premium to purchase non-GM food), and (iv) who would consume GM at some discount.   
Estimating the Size of Demand for GM and Non-GM Food 
We further analyze the 58 percent who would be willing to pay some premium. 
This is a segment of UK population determining the strength of demand for non-GM food 
along with protest responses (8 %) and likely to consist of two groups: (i) who indicates 
that they would never consume GM food at any discount, (ii) who would consider 
purchasing GM food if the premium for non-GM food is perceived too high.  On average, 
respondents were willing to pay £0.57 more to purchase a box of breakfast cereals made 
of non-GM ingredients (base price £2.80) and willing to spend 16.5 % more as weekly 
food expenditure to ensure that they buy non-GM food.   
The strength (or weakness) of the demand for GM food is represented by the 33.9 
percent who indicated that they would be willing to accept some discount in return for 
buying a box of GM breakfast cereals and 36.7 % who indicated that they would be 
willing to accept GM food in return for some decrease in their weekly food bill.    
Average discount of £0.65 was needed to motivate this group to purchase a box of 
breakfast cereals made of GM ingredients, while 21.8 % decrease in weekly food 
expenditure bill on average would induce consumers to switch from non-GM to GM food.  
In addition, about 12 percent indicated that they would not require discount to consume 
GM food.   12
The discussion above presented information critical to assessing the potential 
market size of non-GM and GM food and is summarized in Table 3.  In essence, 
behavioral intentions as measured with WTP and WTA display that there is a strong 
demand for non-GM food as evidenced by the 46 percent who would never consume GM 
food (as revealed in WTA) and 57 percent who would be willing to pay some premium to 
avoid GM food (as revealed in WTP).   
Nevertheless, if food supply chain starts to use GM ingredients and offer labeled 
GM and non-GM food, the analysis shows that there would be a certain segment of UK 
consumers who would demand GM food: i.e., 12 percent who do not differentiate 
between GM and non-GM food and 34 ~37 percent who would be willing to consume 
GM food when offered price discounts.  Moon and Balasubramanian (2003) labeled the 
former as a group of GM technology-embracing and the latter as a group of price-
conscious consumers.   
Table 4 shows mean willingness-to-pay (WTP) and willingness-to-accept (WTA) 
and their difference.  Mean WTA is significantly greater than mean WTP for both 
product categories: (i) breakfast cereals and (ii) weekly food expenditure bill.  This result 
indicates that valuation of GM and non-GM food is associated with either endowment 
effect or imperfect substitutability or both.  Given that mean WTP and WTA represent 
the intensity of demand for non-GM and GM food, respectively, the larger the mean 
WTP, the greater the demand for non-GM food.; the larger the mean WTA, the weaker is 
the demand for GM food.   
An implication of the rejection of the equivalence between WTA and WTP is that 
the weakness of demand for GM food can not be inferred from the intensity of demand   13
for non-GM food.  In other words, these two measures are not symmetric in the case of 
GM food: i.e., the negative of the mean WTP is not the mean WTA.  This asymmetry 
indicates that underestimation is likely to arise in estimating the weakness of the demand 
for GM food when WTP estimates are used as a proxy for WTA. 
Table 5 presents mean WTP and WTA with and without the cheap talk script.  It 
shows that mean WTPs without the script are generally higher when compared to those 
with the script, but the difference was not significant.  Interestingly, the cheap talk script 
made greater difference in WTAs.  This result is significant given that hypothetical bias 
was debated largely in terms of willingness-to-pay rather than willingness-to-accept and 
the cheap talk script method has been tested only on WTP questions.  Our result, however, 
demonstrates that hypothetical bias can arise in WTA questions and explaining the nature 
of hypothetical bias may motivate respondents to ponder about their true minimum 
amount of discount that they would be willing to accept.  
Regression Models for WTP and WTA 
  With the CV questions generating value responses in the form of intervals rather 
than point estimates, midpoints of the intervals may be used as approximations to the true 
unobserved values to fit a univariate distribution of values.  The midpoints can also be 
used as the dependent variable in ordinary least square (OLS) regression.   In 
consideration of the fact that expected values within the intervals are not necessarily 
equal to the interval midpoints, the maximum likelihood (ML) estimator proposed by 
Cameron and Huppert (1989) is appropriate for estimating our WTP and WTA for non-
GM and GM food.   
In addition, responses to WTP and WTA questions in our survey include about 13   14
percent of respondents who would not be willing to pay a premium for non-GM food or 
who would not require any discount to consume GM food.  That is, efficiency may be 
gained by distinguishing zeros from positive observations and accounting for systematic 
differences in unobserved characteristics affecting the endogenous discrete decision 
whether or not to pay a premium.  In our study, the ML estimator proposed by Cameron 
and James (1989) is extended to test for potential two-stage decision process involving: 
(i) whether to pay (accept) a premium (discount), and (ii) what size of premium 
(discount) to choose, contingent on the first decision.  Specifically, we use a two-stage 
interval data model developed by Bhat (1994) incorporating Heckman-style selection rule.  
The two-stage model is given by, 
D* = Z α + τ 
D = 1 if D* > 0 
   =  0 otherwise, 
 
Y* = X β + ε, ε ~ N [0, σ ] 
Y   = Pj, if Pj-1 < Y* < Pj  where [τ, ε ] ~ N [0, 0, 1, ρ] 
Where Y* is unobserved true valuation; Yi is observed only when D* > 0; D is a binary 
indicator taking one if the latent D* is greater than zero: Z is a vector of explanatory 
variables impacting the decision whether or not to pay a premium; X is a vector of 
variables determining the intensity of willingness to pay given the decision to pay a 
premium.  The model accounts for potential correlation in error terms (τ and ε) between 
the two equations.  The log-likelihood function representing two-stage model adapted to 
the interval data is given by,  
  Log L = Σ D = 0 log [ 1 – Φ (Zα) ] +  
                Σ D = 1, Y = j log [Φ2 (Pj – Xβ, Zα, ρ) -  Φ2 (P j-1 – Xβ, Zα, ρ) ] 
   15
Where Φ is cumulative distribution function and Φ2 is bivariate normal cumulative 
distribution function. 
  With regard to the specification of variables affecting WTP/WTA, we have little 
reason to differentiate between Z and X in the two-stage interval data models.  Hence, Z 
and X include the same set of variables for WTP and WTA models.  Empirical model 
specification in this study is based on the premises that WTP/WTA is determined by 
consumer attitude (acceptance) toward agrobiotechnology and such attitude is in turn 
shaped by the risks and benefits perceived by consumers.  In this study, perceived risks 
are measured on five items: (1) health risks, (2) environmental risks, (3) moral and ethical 
considerations, (4) image of multinational corporations as the primary beneficiaries of 
biotechnology, and (5) growing control of multinational corporations over farming.  
Perceived benefits are measured on three items: (1) potential increase in yields in crop 
production, (2) reduced use of chemicals in crop production, and (3) potential 
improvement in nutritional contents of crops.   
In addition, we hypothesize that WTP/WTA would be influenced by the degree of 
trust that consumers place on regulatory agencies.  If consumers believe that government 
has adequate regulations for GM food, we expect that they would be less likely to be 
willing to pay premium to avoid GM food or to require discount to purchase GM food. 
We also anticipate that respondents’ knowledge of agbiotech issues would affect 
WTP/WTA.  Finally, we include two binary variables representing the effects of cheap 
talk script and question ordering between WTP and WTA, respectively.   
The  resulting model is captured in the vector, X = [Risk, Benefit, Trust, 
Knowledge, D1, D2] where Risk represents an index of perceived risks comprising of the   16
five negative attributes; Benefit represents an index of perceived benefits comprising of 
the three positive attributes; Trust represents the degree of trust that consumer place on 
government; Knowledge refers to self-rated knowledge of agbiotech issues; D1 refers to a 
binary variable taking 1 if consumers were exposed to the cheap talk script; D2 refers to a 
binary variable taking 1 if consumers were exposed to questionnaires presenting WTP 
questions prior to WTA questions.   
Results 
Estimated results show that risk and benefit perceptions had expected signs both 
in the first (zero/one) and second (positive amount) stages.  When consumers perceived 
risks in connection with agrobiotechnology or GM food, they were more likely to decide 
to pay a certain amount of premium to avoid GM food or require discount to purchase 
GM food in exchange for giving up non-GM food.  Even when they (who perceived 
risks) selected positive WTP/WTA, they were likely to pay larger premium or require 
larger discount.  In contrast, when consumers perceived benefits from agrobiotechnology 
or GM food, they were less likely to decide to pay premium or require discount to 
purchase GM food.  Even when they (who perceived benefits) selected positive 
WTP/WTA, they were likely to decide to pay smaller premium or require smaller 
discount.   
Respondents who believe that regulatory agencies have adequate policies to 
assure the safety of GM food were less likely to decide to pay premium or require 
discount.  Self-rated knowledge about agrobiotech issues, however, did not make a 
significant difference in the two decisions.  Income was statistically significant only in 
determining willingness-to-pay premium in the form of an increase in weekly food   17
expenditure bill.  Males were more likely to select zero premium (for WTP) or zero 
discount (for WTA) compared to females.  When selected positive WTP or WTA, they 
were predisposed to select smaller premium or discount.   
Cheap talk script did not make a difference in stated WTP values, while having a 
significant impact on stated WTA values.  That is, respondents who were exposed to the 
cheap talk script were more likely to select zero discount and when they selected a 
positive amount of discount, it would be significantly smaller compared to that of 
respondents without the cheap talk script.   
Question ordering between WTP and WTA had impact on stated WTP values, but 
not on stated WTA values.  Presenting WTP questions before WTA significantly reduced 
the likelihood of selecting positive premium when compared to the case of presenting 
WTA questions first.  When respondents (faced with the question ordering of 
WTP/WTA) selected positive premium, their amount of WTP was significantly smaller 
compared with stated WTP values from the ordering of WTA/WTP.  A plausible reason 
is that when first presented with WTA questions, respondents use their WTA responses to 
frame answers to WTP questions, causing respondents to bid higher premium 
inconsistent with their true preference. 
Conclusions 
In an attempt to enhance our understanding of European consumers’ preference 
between GM and non-GM foods, our study elicited UK consumers’ willingness-to-accept 
(WTA) discount in exchange for giving up non-GM food and willingness-to-pay (WTP) 
premium for non-GM food.  Eliciting only WTP does not provide sufficient information 
for determining substitutability between GM and non-GM food.  Survey results indicate   18
that there is a strong demand for non-GM food in the UK, but a non-negligible segment 
expressed their willingness to substitute non-GM food with GM version either without 
discount (12 %) or with discounts (34 %).  This result suggests that there is an economic 
incentive for food industry in Europe to offer GM food to consumers.  
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Table 1.  WTP and WTA question wordings 
 Willingness-to-pay  Willingness-to-accept 
A box of 
breakfast  
cereals 
Suppose the price of breakfast cereals made from GM 
crops is £2.80 per box.  The price of conventional nonGM 
breakfast cereals will be higher than £2.80, but is not 
determined yet.  What is the most above the current price of 
£2.80 you would be willing to pay to purchase a box of 
conventional non-GM breakfast cereals?] 
 
Suppose the prices of breakfast 
cereals of both types are identical at 
£2.80.  The grocery store offers a 
discount to promote the sales of GM 
breakfast cereals.  What is the 
minimum amount of discount below 
the current price of £2.80 that would 
make you want to purchase a box of 




Suppose that it generally costs more to purchase non-GM 
foods due to segregation and labeling requirements.  What 
is the maximum percentage increase in your weekly food 
bill that you are willing to incur to ensure that you do not 
eat GM foods? 
 
Suppose that the grocery store offers 
discounts to promote the sales of GM 
food products.  What is the minimum 
percentage decrease in your weekly 
food bill that will make you want to 
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WTP WTA  Increase/Decrease   
In Weekly food bill 
WTP   WTA 
£ 0.00 
 
21.2 %  12.0 %  0 %  20.5 %  12.0 % 
£ 0.01~£ 0.07 
 
4  1.7  0.01% ~ 2.5 %  5.7  2.1 
0.08~0.14 
 
5.1  1.7  2.6  ~ 5  10  3.4 
0.15~0.21 
 
8.7 2.2  6  ~  7.55  2.1 2.0 
0.22~0.28 
 
4.8 1.7  7.6  ~  10  7.7 3.6 
0.29~0.35 
 
4.3  2.0  11  ~ 12.5  8.1  3.9 
0.36~0.53 
 
7.2 4.1  12.6  ~  18.9  2.8 2.4 
0.54~0.70 
 
6.0 4.9  19  ~  25  7.6 5.3 
0.71~0.88 
 
0.9 1.7  26  ~  31  2.0 2.4 
0.89~1.05 
 
4.6 4.7  32  ~37  0.5 1.4 
1.06~1.23 
 
2.1 2.4  38  ~44  0.6 0.6 
1.24~1.40 
 
1.5 2.5  45  ~50  2.9 4.5 
1.41~1.75 
 
0.9 1.0  51  ~  62  1.2 1.8 
1.76~2.10 
 
0.6 0.8  63  ~  75  0.6 0.7 
2.11 or higher 
 
9.0 3.9  76  or  higher 6.6 3.7 
Don’t know 
 
19.54  7.5   Don’t know  20.4   8.3  
I’ll never buy GM 
food at any discount 
 
N/A  46.6   I’ll never buy GM 
food at any discount 
N/A 43.0   
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Table 3.  Summary information from WTP and WTA responses 
 Willingness-to-pay Willingness-to-accept 
  A box of break- 
fast cereals (£) 
Weekly food 
expenditure (%) 
A box of break-
fast cereals (£) 
Weekly food 
expenditure (%) 
Never consumer GM 
 
N/A N/A  46.6  %  43.6 
Don’t know 
 
21.5 %  20.4 %  7.5.0 %  8.3 % 
WTP premium  
 
57 %   59 %   N/A  N/A 
WTA discount 
 
N/A  N/A  33.9 %  36.7 % 
Do not differentiate 
between GM and 
non-GM 
 
12.8 %  13.7 %  12.0 %  12.1 % 
Protest responses 
 
8 %  8 %  N/A  N/A 
Sum 
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Table 4.  Mean difference between WTP and WTA. 
 Breakfast  Cereals 
 
Weekly Food Expenditure 




 £ 0.57   £ 0.65  16.5 %  21.8 % 
Mean difference 
(WTA-WTP) 
£ 0.65 – £ 0.57 = £ 0.08  21.8 % – 16.5 % = 5.3 % 




Weekly Food Expenditure 
 WTP  WTA  WTP  WTA 
 
Mean with  
Cheap talk script 
 
 £ 0.55   £ 0.60  16.27 %  20.43 % 
Mean without  
Cheap talk script 
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Table 6.  Parameter estimates from two-stage interval data model for WTA/WTP. 
  Breakfast Cereals  Weekly Food Expenditure 






























Constant   0.7395   1.075   1.5873   4.415   0.7876   1.147   43.6321  3.553 
Risk   0.5743
***    8.566   0.3816
***   11.32   0.5821
***   8.372   13.772
***  12.15 
Benefit  -0.4543
*** -4.554  -0.2339
***  -6.676 -0.5144
*** -6.124  -8.5800
***  7.109 
Trust  -0.1018
** -2.098  -0.1245
***  -5.119 -0.0906
*   -1.782  -4.5756
***  5.550 
Knowledge  -0.0200   0.6552   0.0094   0.593   0.0163   0.519   0.5737  1.058 
Cheap Talk   0.1533   1.212  -0.2348
***  -3.905 -0.2365
* -1.815  -5.7100
**  -2.644 
Q_Ordering   0.0652   0.518  -0.0308   0.486  -0.2228  -1.719  -1.5165  -0.704 
Income   0.0276   1.022   0.0098   0.729   0.0348   1.250   0.2916  0.633 
Gender  -0.0218   0.1597  -0.1215
*  -1.836 -0.0510    -0.363  -2.8447  -1.265 
Age  -0.0012   0.2036   0.0024   0.002  -0.0010   0.1886   0.1529  1.607 




Constant  -0.1269   0.2193   0.5054   1.572  -0.3317   0.574   6.3084   0.600 
Risk   0.4335
***   8.002   0.1789
***   5.9826   0.4127
***   7.682   5.2500
***   5.366 
Benefit  -0.1920
*** -3.078  -0.0759
***  -2.383 -0.1883
*** -3.027  -3.107
***  -3.013 
Trust  -0.0831
** -2.109  -0.0294  -1.368 -0.1133
*** -2.941  -0.6363  -0.907 
Knowledge   0.0227   0.883   0.0227   1.591   0.0469   1.873  1.2923   1.554 
Cheap Talk  -0.0412   0.392  -0.0548  -0.932   0.1081   1.057  -0.3378  -0.187 
Q_Ordering  -0.3207
*** -3.046  -0.5073
***  -8.727 -0.1066  -1.048 -12.435
***  -6.915 
Income   0.0161   0.712   0.0069   0.576   0.0390
*   1.793  0.5962
*   1.654 
Gender  -0.2274
** -2.053  -0.0179  -0.297 -0.3176
*** -2.919  0.4558   0.244 
Age  -0.0093 -2.076  -0.0025  -1.036 -0.0078  -1.802 -0.0612  -0.775 
Education   0.0112   0.808   0.0003   0.044   0.0018   0.130  -0.1628  -0.621 
 
 
 